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ABSTRACT
Machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial in-
puts that induce seemingly unjustifiable errors. As automated
classifiers are increasingly used in industrial control systems
and machinery, these adversarial errors could grow to be a
serious problem. Despite numerous studies over the past few
years, the field of adversarial ML is still considered alchemy,
with no practical unbroken defenses demonstrated to date,
leaving PHM practitioners with few meaningful ways of ad-
dressing the problem. We introduce turbidity detection as a
practical superset of the adversarial input detection problem,
coping with adversarial campaigns rather than statistically
invisible one-offs. This perspective is coupled with ROC-
theoretic design guidance that prescribes an inexpensive do-
main adaptation layer at the output of a deep learning model
during an attack campaign. The result aims to approximate
the Bayes optimal mitigation that ameliorates the detection
model’s degraded health. A proactively reactive type of prog-
nostics is achieved via Monte Carlo simulation of various ad-
versarial campaign scenarios, by sampling from the model’s
own turbidity distribution to quickly deploy the correct miti-
gation during a real-world campaign.
1. INTRODUCTION
A machine learning application often begins with a dataset
of examples and the task is to find a classification model that
will turn inputs into class-label predictions, while preserving
some sense of minimum expected error. The learning prob-
lem is often unrealizable, so no perfect model exists that will
have 0 generalization error (Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-David,
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2014). But less obviously, it is often possible to determin-
istically find input examples that force the model to misclas-
sify (Szegedy et al., 2014). Machine learning (ML) models
can be subjected to adversarially crafted small perturbations
that purposely induce these errors, and they can seem unjus-
tified or surprising to a human observer (e.g., a digital image
of a school bus mistaken for a bird). As automated ML-
based classifiers pervade across applications in transporta-
tion, medicine, finance, and cybersecurity, adversarial errors
could grow to be a very serious problem. The danger is par-
ticularly acute in industrial control systems (ICS), industrial
Internet of Things (IIoT), automation equipment, and factory
robotics, where malfunctions can be life-threatening (e.g., steel
mill furnace explosions, power grid crashes, etc.). Unfortu-
nately, ICS attacks are on the rise, with increased vectors for
malicious party access to critical infrastructure (National Cy-
bersecurity and Communications Integration Center, 2017).
Detection of attacks to cyberphysical systems (Yan et al., 2018),
and particularly as it relates to adversarial ML, is a growing
area of concern that has been underserved in PHM literature.
Despite vigorous study over the past few years (see review
in (Gilmer, Adams, Goodfellow, Andersen, & Dahl, 2018)),
the field of adversarial ML is considered by researchers to
be at a nascent stage (Evans, 2018), with no practical un-
broken defenses demonstrated to date (attacks succeed with
p > .25) (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a), and still talks of an
“arms race” between attackers and defenders (Goodfellow,
McDaniel, & Papernot, 2018). This leaves PHM practition-
ers with few meaningful ways of addressing the problem. We
have identified a fundamental flaw in the current interpreta-
tion of adversarial defenses, and offer an alternative practical
reformulation of the problem that copes with population-level
campaign mitigation as opposed to individual input, case-by-
case protection.
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The defense side of adversarial ML has tried to answer a
blend of two questions: (a) How to robustify a model (make
it harder for an attacker to fool)? This has led to adver-
sarial training, defensive distillation, feature squeezing, ar-
chitecture modification, and minimax optimization (Madry,
Makelov, Schmidt, Tsipras, & Vladu, 2017); and (b) What
can be measured about adversarial inputs that is different from
regular ones? This has led to input validators and adversarial
detectors (Goodfellow et al., 2018). Generative adversarial
networks (GANs) can synthesize adversarial examples which
can then be used to retrain the classifier, however, this only
helps insofar as it gets a classifier closer to Bayes optimal-
ity (it can also make things worse). By omissions in the cur-
rent discourse, these methods have created the illusion that we
could one day prebake a solution at training time that will pro-
tect a model against one-or-few-off adversarial inputs at de-
ployment time. Our work suggests that the latter goal comes
at a disproportionate price in expected error. Intuitively, if
there was a way to accurately detect error-inducing inputs at
runtime, then that same detector would have been used to aug-
ment or improve the training to begin with.
In the following sections, we will introduce turbidity detec-
tion as a different, ROC-centric way of thinking about adver-
sarial example detection that fixes current widespread misin-
terpretations and leads to a practical mitigation. Our theory
yields 3 previously unreported results: (i) unqualified use of
an adversarial detector inverts ROC (harms); (ii) adversarial
campaign pinches down ROC (harms); and (iii) conditions
exist where the ROC can be repaired to at least a gracefully
degraded state during the campaign. We propose a method-
ology for putting that into practice and show experimental re-
sults using image (digit recognition) and IIoT security (mal-
ware detection) data.
2. TURBIDITY DETECTION THEORY
Our first aim is to show that the unqualified use of an adver-
sarial detector has deleterious effect on ROC. To that end, we
will start in a seemingly restrictive setting: 1-dimensional in-
put, uniform distribution over –10 to 10, binary output from
binomial discrete-choice theory with logistic noise, equiprob-
able classes, and Bayes decision rule. However, our main re-
sults (ROC inversion, pinching, and repair) will not critically
depend on these specific choices, retaining clarity of illustra-
tion without loss of generality.
Instead of asking where adversarial examples are “hiding” in
high-dimensional input space, we focus on the scalar deci-
sion score output axis (preactivation/logit or post-activation/
pseudo-probability), where model-processed samples have to
end up anyway, and where any decision confusion actually
occurs. Figure 1 shows a deep neural network taking an in-
put array through convolutional and nonlinear activation lay-
ers, then dense layers reducing the output to a scalar deci-
sion score s (here logit). Consider a data-generating process
(DGP) such that ground-truth bipolar labels y ∈ {−1,+1}
come from adding the score to a Logistic(0, 1) symmetric
noise ξ (whose scale and bias control class separability and
class imbalance respectively), and taking sign:
y = sign(s+ ξ) . (1)
The symmetry of the noise about its 0 mean implies our DGP
emits equiprobable labels: P (0) = P (1) = 0.5. In order to
output a monotonic and correctly calibrated posterior prob-
ability P (1|s), what the last-layer activation of the deep net
“wants to be” is the CDF of the discrete-choice noise:
P (y = 1|s) =
∞∫
0
pξ(s
′ − s)ds′
=
∞∫
−s
pξ(s
′)ds′ = 1−
−s∫
−∞
pξ(s
′)ds′
= 1− CDFξ(−s) = CDFξ(s) .
(2)
The logistic-distributed noise has logistic sigmoid CDF, agree-
ing with an output neuron (here with µ = 0, c = 1):
ξ ∼ Logistic(µ, c) ⇒ CDFξ(s) = 1
1 + e
−
(
s−µ
c
) = σ ( s−µc ) .
The Bayes-optimal decision rule (one yielding least probabil-
ity of misclassification in our DGP) corresponds to the homo-
geneous halfspace (here semiaxis) obtained by thresholding
the above posterior probability at 0.5, or directly threshold-
ing the preactivation score:
yˆ = sign(s) . (4)
Now we derive the ROC for this ideal detector in its regu-
lar environment. From Bayes theorem, the 0 (“clean”)-vs-1
(“mal”) class-conditionals of the score are
p(s|0) = Fξ(−s)U(s;−10, 10)/0.5 ,
p(s|1) = Fξ(s)U(s;−10, 10)/0.5 , (5)
(see Figure 2(a)) where F (·) denotes CDF from now on, U(s;
–10,10) = [10 ≤ s ≤ 10]/20 is the uniform PDF, and that last
Iverson bracket [·] means indicator function: valued 1 when
the event s-within-the-interval is true and 0 otherwise. In our
1D mathematical reference figures, the score is directly equal
to the input: s = x (while in higher dimensions, it will be an
inner product where coordinates can be explanatory variables,
features, previous neural layers, etc.).
The marginal of scores is the uniform PDF (Figure 2(b)),
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Figure 1. Deep neural network from input to scalar decision score s with discrete-choice true label y.
while the malicious class-posterior is (Figure 2(c)):
P (1|s) = p(s|1) ·
1
2
p(s|0) · 12 + p(s|1) · 12
= Fξ(s) . (6)
Finally, monotonicity of the class-1 posterior allows us to ob-
tain the ROC from a single sweep on the s-axis, yielding the
parametric curve (Figure 2(d)):
(FPr, TPr) = (1− F0(s), 1− F1(s)) , (7)
where
F0(s) =
s∫
−∞
p(s′|0)ds′ , F1(s) =
s∫
−∞
p(s′|1)ds′ . (8)
2.1. Clarity and Turbidity Distributions
Unless classes are 100% separable in a generalization pre-
serving way relative to the DGP (input features, label noise,
and their statistical relation), every model, including the Bayes-
optimal one, experiences difficulty whenever it makes the wrong
class prediction. We say that samples that confuse the model,
i.e., FPs and FNs, are turbid from the model’s point of view,
whereas all the other correctly-classified TNs and TPs are
clear. We can think of every model that tackles the original 0-
vs-1 problem as having an inherent dual problem: separating
clear-vs-turbid (denoted e-vs-d as mnemonic for “easy”-vs-
“difficult”), for which a different detector can be built. Since
the model’s confusion depends on its output threshold, by de-
fault we peg the associated turbidity detection concept to the
maximum balanced-accuracy/Youden index threshold in the
original detector
θ = argmax
θ∈[0,1]
{TPr(θ)− FPr(θ)} , (9)
i.e., the ROC operating point closest to upper-left corner.
Next we present the clarity and turbidity distributions for a
DGP where there is 50-50% proportion of clear vs turbid
samples (something that we will characterize as a toxic envi-
ronment compared to the regular one where mistakes should
be rare), and 50-50% proportion of clean vs mal within each.
Obtain each conditional as a mixture of the truncated class-0
plus the truncated class-1 PDFs. For example, the left half
of turbidity p(s|d) consists of the left tail of p(s|1) (= FNs)
normalized by the area under it up to 0 (= F1(0)), while the
right half has the right tail of p(s|0) (= FPs) normalized by the
area under it from 0 onward (= 1−F0(0) = F1(0) = .0693).
The mixture of these 2 densities then gives the inflexed arch
3
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Figure 2. Top: Class-conditionals, marginal, posterior, and ROC of 0-vs-1 detector in regular environment. Bottom: Class-
conditionals, marginal, posterior, and ROC of corresponding e-vs-d detector.
shape (purple in Figure 2(e)), similar to a truncated Laplace
distribution:
p(s|e) =
1
2p(s|0)[s<0]+
1
2p(s|1)[s≥0]
F0(0)
,
p(s|d) =
1
2p(s|0)[s≥0]+
1
2p(s|1)[s<0]
F1(0)
.
(10)
Obtain the marginal of scores from the equiprobable mixture
of the clear and turbid distributions (or from total probabil-
ity theorem; Figure 2(f)), and the turbidity class-posterior as
(Figure 2(g)):
P (d|s) = p(s|d) ·
1
2
p(s|e) · 12 + p(s|d) · 12
. (11)
Note that this symmetric reverse-ogee arch is nonmonotonic.
This implies that the theoretical ROC curve can no longer be
obtained simply by sweeping a single threshold over the s do-
main; doing so would result in a suboptimal improper curve
(under diagonal chance line). The most general method is
to sweep a descending threshold on the vertical axis of the
class-posterior, nonlinearly solve/root-find all critical s val-
ues where posterior intersects the threshold, then calculate
area under class-conditionals over s regions so as to obtain
the pair (FPr, TPr). In effect, the ROC curve computa-
tion becomes multibranched, with number of connected seg-
ments dependent on number of intersections encountered dur-
ing the sweep. A general multibranched algorithm is given in
Appendix A1. Figure 2(h) shows the exact ROC, using ei-
ther the multibranched algorithm just described or an alter-
native monotonic version afforded by symmetry in this case.
Luckily, when data scientists compute an empirical ROC (i.e.,
from a data sample), they automatically obtain a Monte Carlo
estimate, so theoretical complications like the nonmonotonic-
ity above are never encountered. However, the scores should
be presented as the possibly nonmonotonic posteriors instead
of as preactivations.
2.2. Relation to Adversarial Detection
The widely accepted oracle definition of adversarial exam-
ples (Evans, 2018) states that: (i) they are created with in-
tent to deceive, (ii) they start from a seed example of say
class A, correctly seen as class A by the model, and (iii) af-
ter perturbation they still behave like class A according to
the oracle/ground-truth, yet they are now incorrectly seen as
class B by the model. However, the goal of adversarial exam-
ple detection (accurately determining at runtime whether an
input is adversarial) has been widely misconstrued, leading to
overfitting and/or invalidly-dichotomized detectors. If we in-
sist we can detect a particular set of adversarial samples, then
that same detector is bound to fail on a freshly created one
operating in a regular environment. It will work if operated
in a toxic environment, but then for a whole different reason
as we’ll see below.
A typical adversarial detection experiment starts from a dataset
of regular samples, takes each instance in the dataset as a
seed to which a transformation (e.g., from CleverHans li-
brary (Papernot et al., 2016)) is applied in order to create
an adversarial counterpart, and then sees if the “regular-vs-
adversarial” examples are discernible in some way (e.g., by
showing differences in distributions or by building adversarial
4
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detectors and measuring their above-chance discrimination).
By definition, all adversarial examples are turbid. Further,
they can exist with “high model confidence” (with P (0|x)
or P (1|x) near 1). But exactly the same is true of natural,
unforced errors. All regular FPs and FNs are turbid, and
while most are associated with low confidence (P (0|x) =
P (1|x) = 0.5) near model’s decision boundary, high-confidence
ones also arise. They happen as predicted even by the 1D
DGP, just less frequently, consistent with the tapered-but-still-
nonzero tails of the turbidity distribution. Thus, regular and
adversarial samples can share the same domain.
We don’t believe human intent is a distinguishing feature that
can be measured either—a view hinted in (Carlini & Wag-
ner, 2017a)—anymore than telling if the person who made the
samples was left-handed from looking at the numerical input
coordinates. So what is it in the standard adversarial detec-
tion experiment that is being detected? Answer: the observed
difference between regular and adversarial conditions stems
from the fact that all adversarial samples are turbid/difficult
by definition, whereas in the regular environment turbid sam-
ples are rare. Turbid samples tend to concentrate while reg-
ular ≈ clear tend to spread, thus second moments separate.
A scientific animation illustrating this point can be seen in
(Echauz, 2019).
These issues can be fixed by moving from a fortuitous “regular-
vs-adversarial” dichotomy to the principled “clear-vs-turbid,”
and by not blurring the line between detector and its intended
deployment environment (Gilmer et al., 2018). Dropping in-
tent and seed-of-origin out of the adversarial character makes
the problem realistic and applicable to campaign mitigation.
2.3. ROC Inversion
We now show that a realistic adversarial (i.e., e-vs-d) detector
cannot actionably help 0-vs-1 decision-making in a regular
environment as it leads to ROC inversion. In the spirit of re-
ductio ad absurdum, let the theoretical 1D adversarial detec-
tor A(x) in Figures 2(g,h), Eq. (11) augment the probabilistic
0-vs-1 detector D(x) in Figures 2(c,d), Eq. (6). Given any
input x′ at test time, if A(x′) is accurately declaring that x′
is adversarial then we would want to contradict the decision
from D(x′). From the point of view of A(x), the Bayes trig-
ger to declare adversariness is A(x) > 0.5, which is equiva-
lent to checking if input magnitude is within a critical cutoff:
|x| < 2.597 (also equal to the crossover points in Figure 2(e)).
The augmented detector becomes
yˆ = sign(x)sign(|x| − 2.597) , (12)
and the augmented-system posterior probability is:
Paug(1|x) = Fξ(x)[|x| > 2.597] + Fξ(−x)[|x| ≤ 2.597] .
(Any function that reverses the D(x) decision within that
interval will work.) Figure 3(a) shows this nonmonotonic
posterior. Figure 3(b) shows the exact ROC using multi-
branched algorithm. The original accuracy of F0(0)P (0) +
(1 − F1(0))P (1) = 0.93 goes down to 0.79. The original
detector was already optimal for its intended regular envi-
ronment, and overriding its decisions only makes it worse.
Thus, protection against one-off adversarial examples is a
misguided design goal.
Figure 3. Posterior and ROC of the augmented original +
turbidity detector leading to ROC inversion.
2.4. ROC Pinch-Down
We now show that operating the original 0-vs-1 detector in
a toxic environment leads to an ROC pinch-down. Under
adversarial campaign, class-conditionals can display abnor-
mal concentrations around the original decision score thresh-
old, a single crossover (as in Figure 2(a)) can become mul-
tiple, class-posterior can turn nonmonotonic, and errors be-
come frequent, making model performance plummet. Con-
tinuing with the balanced proportions of 50-50% e-vs-d and
50%-50% 0-vs-1 of Section 2.1, the class-conditional likeli-
hoods that the original detector now has to confront are (Fig-
ure 4(a)):
ptoxic(x|0) = pe(x)[x ≥ 0] + pd(x)[x < 0] ,
ptoxic(x|1) = pe(x)[x < 0] + pd(x)[x ≥ 0] , (14)
where pe and pd are the conditionals in Eq. 10.
Figure 4. Class-conditionals in toxic environment leading to
ROC pinch-down.
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The marginal of inputs is identical to Figure 2(f), just com-
posed differently from the average of the above toxic condi-
tionals. The posterior (not shown) is the same one in Figure
2(c) since the model remained naively unchanged during this
toxic campaign. The exact ROC (Figure 4(b)) can be obtained
here from the monotonic sweep form in Eq. 7, except with
F0,toxic and F1,toxic. So while augmenting the detector dur-
ing normal operation was harmful, ignoring the problem dur-
ing abnormal operation is also potentially worse. Thus, pro-
tection against adversarial campaigns (not one-offs) is needed.
2.4.1. Asymmetric Toxic Environments
At the 1:1 ratio of e-vs-d samples under both 0 and 1 classes,
the characteristic ROC “seagull” (Figure 4(b)) has curve pinned
at the chance line (50% accuracy). However, at other ra-
tios of turbidity proportions under each class, conditionals
become asymmetric and the pinch point moves somewhere
else. Class-0 e:d ratio controls the horizontal axis (FPr), while
class-1 e:d ratio independently controls the vertical axis (TPr =
1 − FNr). This means that if adversarial campaign actors
could not only add samples but also subtract from the en-
vironment seen by the model, they would be able to place
the pinch-down point anywhere on the ROC plane! But they
would have to be oracles themselves, for example, to force
the model to be always wrong in the future would pin op-
erating point at the bottom-right corner (something we can’t
do ourselves with imperfect knowledge). Figure 5 shows a
toxic formulation where class-0 samples are regular (i.e., no
adversarial FPs), with their natural F0(0) : F1(0) proportion
of clear to turbid, whereas class-1 samples have an unnatural
37.5%-62.5% proportion.
Figure 5. Class-conditionals in asymmetric toxic environ-
ment, moving ROC pinch-down somewhere else.
2.5. Mitigation/Repair of the Degraded ROC
In its intended regular environment, the original model can
adapt to changes in maliciousness imbalance (0-vs-1 preva-
lences) by simply sliding its operating point along the intact,
class prevalence-agnostic ROC curve. However, in the adver-
sarially toxic environment it is no longer enough to simply
adjust a threshold to match the environment; a fundamentally
different detection problem must be solved. In order to “un-
pinch” the ROC to the best available shape given the adver-
sarial campaign, we should obey the new posterior:
Ptoxic(1|x) = ptoxic(x|1)P (1)
ptoxic(x|0)P (0) + ptoxic(x|1)P (1) . (15)
This will typically be nonmonotonic (Figure 6(a)). The ex-
actly repaired ROC is obtained from the multibranched algo-
rithm as shown in Figure 6(b).
Figure 6. New posterior and mitigated/repaired ROC.
The new optimal maximum-a-posteriori Bayes classifier im-
plements decision reversals relative to the original one. Re-
versals occur only within the decision score intervals where
the new heights of 0-vs-1 conditional likelihoods have swapped
their dominance, due to the new concentration of turbid/difficult
samples in the environment. Thus, the mitigated detector is
gracefully (rather than catastrophically) degraded, restoring
acceptable error rates and adaptability to maliciousness im-
balance.
2.5.1. When Repair Isn’t Possible
In some cases it isn’t really possible to “unpinch” the ROC
because the curve morphs into a seamless one with no dent (as
if in Figure 5(b) the pinched point fused into the left branch),
e.g., with ratio of e-vs-d samples still at 1:1 but with mali-
cious class prevalences falling outside of the interval F1(0) <
P (1) < F0(0). The curve is still depressed compared to the
original regular one due to 50% of samples being turbid, and
only detection threshold remains as a potential adjustment.
We have also uncovered adversarial covariate shift as an-
other condition where ROC repair isn’t possible. This would
make score class-conditionals and marginal more turbid while
keeping the posterior intact. For example,
ptoxic(x|0) = (1− Fξ(s)) · (0.5p(x|e) + 0.5p(x|d)) /0.5 ,
ptoxic(x|1) = Fξ(s) · (0.5p(x|e) + 0.5p(x|d)) /0.5 .
The reader can verify that the posterior P (1|x) is exactly re-
covered as Fξ(x), the CDF of the label noise (also true for
other imbalanced 0-vs-1 priors). However, it seems unrealis-
tic that an adversary could shape the conditionals in this fash-
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ion as it would require omnipotent control of the environment
beyond merely adding adversarial samples to the regular one
seen by the model.
2.6. Generalization to Suboptimal Models and Higher Di-
mensions
We have systematically charted an atlas documenting how the
above 1D reference theory is impacted when the model is sub-
optimal instead of Bayes-optimal (via mistuned bias and/or
misaligned weights), and in higher-dimensional input space,
where the decision score s is taken to be the preactivation
x>w, i.e., the (possibly augmented) dot product at the out-
put layer of a probabilistic binary classifier. Due to space
restrictions, we only mention that all ROC inversion, pinch-
down, and mitigation repair results remain qualitatively iden-
tical. The score is still 1D; the only difference is that with
independent components of x, all distributions become win-
dowed/tapered, and ROCs get “dumber”/shallower from the
CLT centrality effect of marginal p(x), which makes samples
appear close to decision boundary more frequently. Injecting
correlation structure in components of x also weakens separa-
bility, but the main ROC results hold. Further, nothing above
prevents decision scores from being computed by non-neural
network models. Thus, the described campaign effects and
mitigation apply to any decision-making component that ex-
poses its scores to attackers, including ensembles of decision
trees widely prevalent in industrial settings.
3. PREEMPTIVE DOMAIN ADAPTATION
The theoretical results in the previous section can be put into
PHM practice by monitoring estimates of the decision score
class-conditional distributions in order to declare if and when
an adversarial campaign is in effect, repair the degraded ROC
during campaign, restore the original model after campaign
subsides, and improve readiness for future attacks via simula-
tion. Assume a well-trained classifier has been deployed in its
originally-intended threat environment where errors are rare
(e.g., > 95% hit at < 0.1% FP rates). A health management
methodology can track 0-vs-1 conditional score histograms
(and optionally error rates), from which class-conditionals
curves are kernel-density estimated (KDE) as smooth func-
tions. This still requires ground-truth label estimates; in cy-
bersecurity they are obtained after some lag ranging from
sub-seconds (with access to cloud-based reputation, etc.) to
days (offline endpoints with sporadic live updates, air-gapped
IIoT devices, etc.). There is also a way to detect without
ground truth, by introspectively looking at whether too many
decision scores are falling in a low-confidence interval, but
this is bypassed if attackers actively inject only high-confidence
samples.
Under adversarial campaign, class-conditionals may develop
multimodality, with multiple crossover points that misfit the
original decision rules, making model performance plummet
for some period of time. This condition can be declared from
observation of empirical ROC pinch-down or abnormally large
error rates. (In the low-confidence campaign case, the model
can track its own decision scores falling in an interval near
decision threshold at higher-than-historical rates, suggesting
adversarial manipulation since it would be rare to see that in
the regular environment.) At that time, an equiprobable class-
posterior function implementing Eq. (15) is transmitted to the
endpoint model to be used as a post-transformation layer of
the original decision scores. The output of this function can
then be thresholded to obtain a desired mitigated ROC oper-
ating point. In effect, this is an inexpensive statistical domain
adaptation that reverses decisions when it makes sense to do
so. The same logic can be applied in reverse to restore the
original model when campaign has subsided.
The methodology above is still 100% reactive defense. Our
investigation suggests that a 100% proactive defense (where
the model is hardened at training time against all future one-
off adversarial samples in the regular environment) is mathe-
matically impossible. Thus, prognostics in the usual sense of
predicting remaining life until failure, to do something about
it before it occurs, is outside the scope of our work. However,
we introduce a proactively reactive compromise. It precom-
putes the optimal response to each of several plausible adver-
sarial attack scenarios, via Monte Carlo simulation drawing
from the model’s own turbidity distribution, and stores that
information as a look-up table to quickly deploy the correct
mitigation during a real-world campaign. A final health main-
tenance modality is to put the decision modification layer into
effect continuously/ prophylactically without waiting to de-
tect that a campaign has begun (in which case the last layer
calculation automatically yields simply an identity function).
This way, as machine operating conditions change even grad-
ually, the method is already there to mitigate possibly harmful
effects while any persistent shifting is investigated.
4. EXPERIMENTS WITH REAL-WORLD DATA
This section verifies the main ROC inversion, pinching, and
repair results using real-world data with corresponding at-
tacks against a deep neural network classifier in two appli-
cation areas: digit recognition and IIoT malware detection.
4.1. Digit Recognition
The standard MNIST benchmark dataset was used, contain-
ing 60,000 grayscale 28×28px images of handwritten digits.
The deep convolutional neural network trained in (Dhaliwal
& Shintre, 2018), whose first layers are visualized in Figure 1,
achieved over 99% accuracy on a holdout split of the data. A
stratified random sample of 2400 images was taken to equally
represent all digits. We adversarially generated 2400 FPs
and 2400 FNs using the Carlini-Wagner algorithm (Carlini
7
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Figure 7. Regular not-1 vs 1 conditional histograms and balanced turbidity histogram from adversarial FPs & FNs.
& Wagner, 2017b). The 10-class problem was dichotomized
into classes ‘not-1’ vs ‘1’ by unfolding the preactivation de-
cision scores as
s =
1
2
(s1 −max{s0, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s9} , (17)
where s1 is the preactivation score at the neuron for class ‘1’
(2nd indicator in softmax layer). That leaves 2160 regular in-
stances of class ‘not-1’ and 240 of ‘1’—a class-prior imbal-
ance of 9:1. Figure 7 shows the pdf-normalized regular condi-
tional histograms (top) and the turbidity distribution from the
adversarial FNs and FPs (bottom; additionally color-coded by
not-1 vs 1 classes). As predicted by the theory, the latter dis-
tribution has a Laplace-like inflex concentration around the
score decision-crossing point (cf. purple in Figure 2(e)). For
clarity, it is shown with balanced not-1s vs 1s within the tur-
bid condition; the regular environment would have 9 times
more FPs than FNs while toxic ones can be manipulated. In
this potentially overfit “99%” accuracy case, we cannot dis-
play an empirical turbidity distribution with only the natural
FPs and FNs because there were only 2 and 0 cases, respec-
tively.
Aided by 2160 of the adversarially discovered FPs and 240 of
the FNs to mimic the natural 9:1 class lopsidedness in the reg-
ular environment, we estimated decision-reversal interval as
[–1.6,1.6] (graphically from intersection of empirical condi-
tional histograms, much like green vs purple curves in Figure
Figure 8. KDE-smoothed class conditionals and correspond-
ing equiprobable posterior for use in repair.
2(e)), and generated the empirical ROC over the 2400 regular
samples. Figure 9(b) inset confirms that the resulting ROC
is inverted. It appears to be small harm but there is actually
almost an order-of-magnitude larger FP rate; this difference
is critical in the field.
The two class-conditional PDFs were estimated using Gaus-
sian kernel and bandwidth B. This is equivalent to fitting
a Gaussian mixture distribution where means equal all in-
dividual data points, and covariances equal the shared con-
stant B2. During a very toxic adversarial campaign where
half of all samples become turbid, KDE-smoothed PDFs from
aggregated data at the desired e-vs-d proportions reveal 3
crossovers (Figure 8(a)). The corresponding equiprobable
posterior crosses the 0.5 threshold 3 times (Figure 8(b)). Op-
erating the original unmitigated detector yields the pinched-
down ROC (Figure 9(c)). In contrast, passing the scores thru
the mitigated posterior function yields the repaired ROC (Fig-
ure 9(d)). Figure 9 confirms the inversion, pinch-down, and
repair as predicted by the theory. We note however that the
empirical nature of the construction makes ROCs look like
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Figure 9. Regular, inverted, pinched-down & repaired ROCs
in adversarial campaign against MNIST detector.
Figure 10. Empirical & smoothed class conditionals and
equiprobable posterior for use in repair of the malware de-
tector under special adversarial campaign.
staircases and it’s impossible to discern convexity of the in-
version from concavity of the pinch-down (something we know
only from the theory).
4.2. Malware Detection from Raw Bytes
Hand-crafted feature engineering for static malware detection
takes substantial expertise and years to develop. Increasingly,
deep learning alternatives are showing promise as end-to-end
feature learners-plus-classifiers, trained from raw binary file
examples (Raff et al., 2017; Krcˇa´l, Sˇvec, Jasˇek, & Ba´lek,
2018). We now verify the adversarial campaign health man-
agement framework using a pre-production model intended
for an IIoT “ICSP Neural” USB scanning device. The model
was made purposely suboptimal (with regular ROC curve far
from upper-left corner) in order to better observe the man-
ifestations of the theory. It contains a deep convolutional
neural network with {embedding, 4 convolutional, 3 dense,
softmax} layers summarized in Appendix A4, trained on half
a million raw executable files (originally aggregated from a
mix of clean and malicious customer submissions and vendor
feeds), XORed with a common byte for inoculation at rest,
Figure 11. Regular, pinched-down & repaired ROCs in spe-
cial adversarial campaign against malware detector.
and spanning at least 6 months of age to encourage learning
‘invariant’ features. This type of network is fed integers in
[0,255] representing bytes of a file zero-padded or cropped
to length 700,000 (as if it were a wide image that is only 1
pixel tall). The test dataset consisted of 2000 clean and 2000
malicious files sampled from a time split spanning one month
after the model’s training date.
One of the simplest adversarial attacks for binaries to cir-
cumvent malware protection is to append a crafted payload at
the end of the file (Kuppa, Grzonkowski, & LeKhac, 2018).
These methods can append a binary string, backdoor legiti-
mate files by adding a new section to the executable (either
as data or code), or use the resource part of the file when
modifying already compiled code. Many far more sophisti-
cated attacks are available (Anderson, Kharkar, Filar, Evans,
& Roth, 2018; Suciu, Coull, & Johns, 2019).
In the present focus of research, the quality of the attack
is less important than just finding misclassification-inducing
perturbations, so we used the brute-force algorithm in Ap-
pendix A3 that appends fixed or random chunks until the
model flips its decision (to within a 1000-trial count toler-
ance). A high-confidence campaign was defined as a set of
new binaries bypassing the model with pseudo-probability
output above 0.97. Drawing seeds from the size-4000 test
set, 512 adversarial FPs and 524 adversarial FNs were cre-
ated this way.
Figure 10 shows the class-conditional likelihoods in the toxic
environment, which are characterized (when pegged to the
regular minimum balanced error score threshold 2.2) by 357
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unforced + 512 forced FPs, plus 498 unforced + 524 forced
FNs, totaling 1891 errors and thus a 62.5%-37.5% clear-to-
turbid ratio. The clean (class 0) conditional is estimated from
ptoxic(s|0) ≈ 1n0
n0∑
i=1
1
B0
K
(
s−s(0)i
B0
)
, (18)
where K(·) is the standard Gaussian kernel, s(0)i are the un-
folded decision scores (2nd-unit softmax preactivation minus
1st) under class 0, and B0 = 0.687 is the bandwidth from
Silverman’s estimate. The malware (class 1) conditional was
similarly obtained with B1 = 0.928. Unlike in previous situ-
ations, this special high-confidence campaign has adversarial
scores dominating at one tail of each distribution, with no ad-
versarial scores in the interval [–4,4]. That creates a complex
posterior with 4 crossovers with respect to 0.5, to be used for
repair (Eq. (15), Figure 10(b)).
Figure 11 shows the devastating effect of this campaign on
ROC and how much could be mitigated. Instead of a single
pinch-down somewhere along the midsection of the curve,
a composite of pinch-down and inversion brings the whole
curve down around the chance line. Passing the original de-
cision scores through the KDE-formed posterior brings the
whole curve back to at least a gracefully degraded state.
We have seen that the health of both image-recognition and
malware-detection components of industrial systems could
be managed using our ROC-centric methodology, but this
requires some “server side,” even if lagged, for label esti-
mates. A subtle implication is that the introspective “client-
side” monitoring alternative in Section 3 (where the device it-
self could declare adversarial campaign if too many decision
scores are landing in an uncertain band) wouldn’t work with
the high-confidence adversarial campaign here. Adversarial
actors aren’t required to play by the small delta-perturbation
rule as much in security as it is with natural images (Gilmer
et al., 2018). Semantic proximity between a regular image x
and adversarial counterpart x′ means that humans wouldn’t
perceive them as belonging to different classes, thus pertur-
bations tend to be small, placing x′ near model’s uncertain
boundaries. For malware, semantic proximity only means
that x′ will still behave maliciously (or clean will stay clean),
not so much that is has to closely resemble the input x. This is
manifested as adversarial distribution modes that are central
in Figure 8 vs at the extreme ends in Figure 10. Knowledge
of this asymmetry can help guide simulations for preemptive
domain adaptation.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The common misunderstanding surrounding what to do about
adversarial inputs that fool detectors can be cleared by fixing
the “regular-vs-adversarial” dichotomy and by recognizing
the difference between one-off/per-trial basis protection vs
adversarial campaign mitigation. Our investigation suggests
that universal pre-hardening defenses are impossible without
paying a price in accuracy of the original model operating in
its regular environment.
We introduced turbidity detection, campaign mitigation, and
preemptive domain adaptation as conceptual frameworks lead-
ing to practicable detector health management solutions. The
theory yielded previously unreported results about ROC in-
version, pinch-down, and repair in the context of adversarial
threats to deep neural networks increasingly used in indus-
try. Though not tested here, results should generalize to non-
neural detectors such as ensembles of decision trees, as long
as there is access to an internal score.
It should be understood that our method is not a panacea to
shield or empower a model; what it does is optimally mitigate
the damage (dramatically so for some ROC operating points)
caused by adversarial toxicity that the original model wasn’t
designed to tackle on its own.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Exact ROC for Nonmonotonic Posterior
Pseudocode for generating the exact multi-branched ROC curve
without data, given possibly nonmonotonic class-t posterior
P (t|s), and F¬t (non-target) vs Ft (target) CDFs.
Input: pre, a vector of preimages of P (t|s) extrema (end-
points of segments to search for roots)
Output: fpr, tpr arrays
Nseg ← len(pre)− 1 . Number of segments
B ← (1− (−1)Nseg)/2 . 0 or 1 per even or odd
fpr, tpr← [B...B] . Broadcast initialization
repeat
Set a threshold θ from grid or random sample
for seg in range(1,Nseg + 1) do
c← root(P (t|s)− θ) . Find root in this segment
fprθ ← fprθ + (−1)segF¬t(c)
tprθ ← tprθ + (−1)segFt(c)
until Enough θ coverage
A.2 Methods to Aid Replication
The reader can quickly verify shapes of distributions and ROCs
in this paper (even if empirically without the benefit of A.1)
via Monte Carlo methods. The reference regular DGP in Sec-
tion 2 can be functional-programmed (in MATLAB/ Mathe-
matica/ R style) directly as
pd = makedist('Logistic','mu',0,'sigma',1)
pdf0 = @(s)pd.cdf(-s).*unifpdf(s,-10,10)/.5
pdf1 = @(s)pd.cdf(s).*unifpdf(s,-10,10)/.5
cdf0 = @(s)integral(@(q)pdf0(q),-Inf,s)
cdf1 = @(s)integral(@(q)pdf1(q),-Inf,s)
Then a functional plotter with adaptively sampled domain and
parametric option will graph ROC directly, e.g., Figure 2(d)
is fplot(@(s)cdf1(-s), @(s)1-cdf1(s)). An empiri-
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cal version of this, e.g., in Python1, can generate n randomly
sampled scores emitted by the DGP. A 1-D dataset X,y con-
sists of matrix X being a length-n array with corresponding
labels y = sign(X+ξ), where the noise array is sampled from
Logistic(0, 1). Now index into data to obtain the correspond-
ing class-conditional histograms of X[y==1] vs X[y==1] (Fig-
ure 2(a)), and an empirical ROC from roc curve(y,X).
The same regular dataset X,y can be indexed to obtain turbid-
ity e-vs-d conditionals, with histograms of
Xe = X[(y == 1 & X < 0) | (y == 1 & X >= 0)]
Xd = X[(y == 1 & X >= 0) | (y == 1 & X < 0)]
(Figure 2(e)). In the regular environment, this will yield ap-
proximately F0(0)n samples (e.g., 9303 when n=10,000) of
‘clear’ vs only F1(0)n samples (e.g., 693) of ‘turbid’. In ad-
versarially altered DGP environments, aspects like accuracy
calculation and the marginal histogram (Figure 2(f)) seen by
the model can be simulated by rebalancing the data via over-
and/or under-sampling by a rational factor that approximates
F0(0)/F1(0) = 13.4., e.g., oversampling the minority class by
13 or 14. The corresponding ye and yd maliciousness labels
can be used to unit-test/verify that accuracy≈ 50% (1st group
all correct, 2nd all wrong).
Regarding turbidity detection, to avoid confusion with y ma-
liciousness labels –1s vs +1s (or 0s vs 1s), we could assign
2s to the ‘clear’ class and 3s to the ‘turbid’ class. Then the
e-vs-d ROC (Figure 2(h)) can be empirically obtained from
true labels [2, 2, . . . (ne times), 3, 3, . . . (nd times)], predicted
soft labels P (d | [Xe,Xd]) from Eq. (10), and ‘3’ as the target
class in the function roc curve.
The ROC pinch-down (Figure 4(b)) can be empirically veri-
fied by sending preactivation scores to the function roc curve
when the DGP is adversarially toxic, e.g., [Xe, repeat(Xd 14
times)]. To verify ROC inversion (Figure 3(b)) or repair (Fig-
ure 6(b)), the scores are first passed thru a possibly nonmono-
tonic posterior function before sending to roc curve. For
inversion, the posterior is Paug in Section 2.3 under a regular
DGP. For repair, the posterior is Eq. (15) under an adversari-
ally toxic DGP.
A.3 High-Confidence Adversarial Attack
A brute-force append attack to generate high-confidence ad-
versarial FPs or FNs from raw binaries.
Input: file, max size, model
Output: file new
function CHECK(X)
pred← model.predict(X)
if pred > pred max then
file new← X
1As of this writing, there is a deprecated 1D-only plotter in scipy, and a
sympy approach that is limited to its known set of functions.
pred max← pred
if pred max > 0.97 then Signal break
file new← file + (max size – file.size) * [0x00]
pred max← model.predict(file new)
for i in range 0x01 to 0xff do . Phase 1: Fill constant
X← file + (max size – file.size) * [i]
CHECK(X)
if pred ≤ 0.97 then . Phase 2: Random chunk if needed
for i in range(0,1000) do
Pick random chunk C in file new(file.size:max size)
Pick random vector V sized as C
X← Replace chunk with C+V
CHECK(X)
Failed to find high-confidence example
A.4 Malware Detector Model Summary
The deep neural network investigated was a sequential Keras-
wrapped TensorFlow model with 840,882 parameters as sum-
marized below.
___________________________________________________________
Layer (type) Output Shape Param #
===========================================================
input (InputLayer) (None, 700000, 1) 0
___________________________________________________________
reshape_1 (Reshape) (None, 700000) 0
___________________________________________________________
embedding (Embedding) (None, 700000, 8) 2048
___________________________________________________________
conv1 (Conv1D) (None, 175000, 48) 12336
___________________________________________________________
relu1 (Activation) (None, 175000, 48) 0
___________________________________________________________
conv2 (Conv1D) (None, 43750, 96) 147552
___________________________________________________________
relu2 (Activation) (None, 43750, 96) 0
___________________________________________________________
temporal_max_pooling (MaxP(None, 10938, 96) 0
___________________________________________________________
conv3 (Conv1D) (None, 1368, 128) 196736
___________________________________________________________
relu3 (Activation) (None, 1368, 128) 0
___________________________________________________________
conv4 (Conv1D) (None, 171, 192) 393408
___________________________________________________________
relu4 (Activation) (None, 171, 192) 0
___________________________________________________________
global_temporal_avg_poolin(None, 1, 192) 0
___________________________________________________________
flatten (Flatten) (None, 192) 0
___________________________________________________________
fc1 (Dense) (None, 192) 37056
___________________________________________________________
selu1 (Activation) (None, 192) 0
___________________________________________________________
fc2 (Dense) (None, 160) 30880
___________________________________________________________
selu2 (Activation) (None, 160) 0
___________________________________________________________
fc3 (Dense) (None, 128) 20608
___________________________________________________________
selu3 (Activation) (None, 128) 0
___________________________________________________________
logits (Dense) (None, 2) 258
___________________________________________________________
output (Activation) (None, 2) 0
===========================================================
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